The German Spring Offensive of 1918 became dangerous very quickly because the British front was hit with surprise, strong numbers, and new assault methods. Kaiserschlacht was meant to create a decisive result before American forces became fully strong in Europe. German troops opened wide gaps and moved fast, but the same speed later created problems with food, ammunition, and control. The offensive became a race between movement and the ability to keep that movement going.
Why the First Breakthrough Was So Serious
The opening days of Kaiserschlacht put the British Army under heavy pressure. German commanders believed the British were already tired after costly fighting in 1917. At the same time, Germany could move many divisions west after the Russian Army broke apart. This gave Ludendorff a chance to concentrate large forces on one part of the front.
German planning was therefore built around a narrow window. The offensive needed to achieve much before American strength increased, so speed was not only a tactical choice but also part of timing.
The British sector chosen for the attack was not in a strong condition. It had recently passed from French to British control, and defensive works still needed improvement. Reinforcements were also becoming fewer. The attack came before these problems could be fully corrected.
When Operation Michael began on 21 March, the difference in numbers was large. Fifty–eight German divisions attacked sixteen British divisions. A wide breach appeared in only some hours. The Irish 16th Division, the 36th Division, and the 66th Division suffered very badly.
Surprise Was More Than Artillery
German planning tried to make confusion before the infantry moved far. Artillery did not spend a long time only hitting the first trench line. Fire was directed toward machine gun positions, artillery batteries, headquarters and railway stations. The bombardment was short but very heavy.

Infantry groups then entered weak places in the British line. They were trained to move around strong positions when possible and continue forward. Other troops came behind them to deal with resistance left in place. This gave the first attack speed and made local defense more difficult.
What Made the German Advance Lose Power
The same movement that brought early success also created a problem. Troops moved forward faster than supplies could follow. Ammunition and food became harder to deliver. Roads were crowded, fighting continued, and the Germans could not keep the first tempo for many days.
Allied resistance also became stronger. Australian troops at Hébuterne were one example of units helping to slow the German movement. Amiens had been under threat, but British reserves were sent toward the broken parts of the front. The situation remained serious, but a complete collapse did not occur.
The main reasons why the early German advantage became harder to maintain were:
- ammunition and food did not reach advancing units fast enough
- Allied resistance became stronger after the first shock
- British reserves were moved toward the threatened sectors
- rapid movement created control and transport difficulties
- the attack did not destroy all organized resistance
Operation Michael as a Test of Speed
Operation Michael was expected to break the British front near Arras and then move north. Railway supply lines were an important target because cutting them could isolate British forces. German planners hoped this could help surround them and force surrender.
At first, the plan looked dangerous enough to make Allied political and military leaders fear a larger collapse. British units withdrew through crowded roads while German artillery increased disorder. Still, the attack slowed after the first days. The large opening remained important, but it did not become the final result Ludendorff wanted.
Operation Georgette Brought a Second Crisis
The next major push came on 9 April in French Flanders. Operation Georgette, also called the Battle of the Lys, again began with a strong German success. Estaires was captured on 9 and 10 April, and Messines Ridge followed on 10 and 11 April.
German troops then pushed toward Hazebrouck, an important railway junction. This advance did not continue far enough. Bailleul was captured and heavily damaged between 12 and 15 April. Another German movement toward Béthune was stopped in fighting around Kemmel Hill from 17 to 19 April.
British formations tried different ways to slow the attack. In Armentières, streets were blocked with whatever material could be found. Around Bailleul, delaying units used railway embankments as protection. Other formations could not keep their positions. The Portuguese Expeditionary Force at Neuve–Chapelle was overwhelmed.
General Foch sent French reinforcements toward Kemmel Hill. On 25 and 26 April, these forces came under a very heavy bombardment and suffered major losses. Even with this pressure, the Allied front was stabilized. By 29 April, Kaiserschlacht had reached its end.
The Human Cost and the Final Result
Losses were high on every side. Between 21 March and 29 April, the British lost 236,000 men. About 20,000 were killed, while around 120,000 were missing, many of them taken prisoner. French losses reached 92,000, with a high share of deaths among units fighting around Kemmel Hill.
German losses in the same period were 348,000. These numbers show how expensive the offensive became while its early speed was disappearing.
Kaiserschlacht created a major Allied crisis and produced large German advances, but it did not bring the decisive success Ludendorff expected. German troops could break lines and move quickly, yet supply limits and growing resistance reduced this advantage. By the end of April, the front had been stabilized, while all sides had already paid a very heavy human cost.